There are 724 footnotes in this book, of which 720 seem to be for English-language sources, mostly American. And the trust in American sources is complete. For example: there's a section on the Racak massacre, with no mention that some French and German papers have cast doubts on the evidence, only a 200-word quote from American observer William Walker. For example: the famous appendix to the Rambouillet accord (granting NATO troops the right to bivouac and billet and make use of any facility anywhere in Yugoslavia) was just boilerplate that would have been deleted on request -- and the backup for this revelation is interviews with an American general and an American envoy. Why didn't they ask Yugoslavs too?

Serb criminals and crimes get full coverage along with epithets like "murderous" or "cowardly" or "atavistic". But nothing on killings of Serbs before the war, and nothing in the text about the Belgrade TV station slaughter, or the cluster bombs that hit the Nis marketplace (though that's in one of the appendixes). As for the Chinese embassy attack, it was obviously inadvertent because there was no sensible reason for it. Thus irrationality connected to Serbs proves they're murderers, while irrationality connected to Americans proves they're innocent.

I found no errors in fact, and I don't expect some balanced presentation of non-American views. But a book that doesn't even note the other views, and excises facts which don't fit with the presentation of the American view, has no value except to those who want to believe that NATO was right. Others will prefer Judah's "Kosovo: War and Revenge" (which at least checked multiple sources), and Parenti's "To Kill a Nation". Or at the extreme there's Noam Chomsky's "The New Military Humanism" which is filled with anti-NATO bias ... about enough to balance the pro-NATO bias in "Winning Ugly".

Daalder and O'Hanlon make the claim that the 1999 NATO air campaign against Milosevic's Serbia was a good thing, since it stopped the ethnic cleansing and left everyone in Kosovo better off than they would have been without NATO's military intervention.

Viewed through the lens of today's headlines, this argument becomes hard to support. The ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Serbs has ceased, to be replaced by similar outrages against Serbs by Kosovars. Net improvement? Nil.

Was the Kosovo air campaign justifiable as a fire-break against further bloodshed in the Balkans? The citizens of Macedonia would demur, I'm afraid.

It is hard to escape the impression that the Kosovo campaign was not only the last of the Wars for Greater Serbia, a point Daalder and O'Hanlon dance around in their conclusions, but also the first of the Wars for Greater Albania -- a point the authors utterly fail to address.

One is ultimately left with the conclusion that the authors have done a very good job of researching and arguing the wrong thesis.

This is a serious and worthwhile study which analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of American leadership and the NATO system in its first offensive war. It is particularly useful to read this book after Kaplan's The Coming Anarchy (also reviewed). Kaplan makes clear there will be a lot more destruction of humanity that will require American leadership and the use of force. Daalder and O'Hanlon make clear that we have a lot to learn if we are going to engage in campaigns like Kosovo.

Anyone who plans to advise the next Administration would be well served by reading these two books together and pondering their implications for improving American decision making and coalition leadership skills in the context of interventions in dangerous places. The clearest points in this book are Daalder and O'Hanlon's judgments that this was the right war, it was ultimately a success, airpower had a powerful but limited influence and without the threat of a land campaign and the Russian abandonment of Milosevic. In their view, airpower by itself would have failed, and that the United States has to lead for these interventions to work and the Clinton Administration consistently failed to lead the public, the Congress or our allies and because of the Clinton's Administrations prior vacillation on Saddam Hussein (loud threats, tiny attacks that ended quickly without coercing Saddam). The confused posturing of the Clinton Administration actually increased the likelihood that force would have to be used because Milosevic had no reason to believe they would actually fight to the end. Once NATO had consolidated its position and the Administration had launched the gamble of forceful coercion Daalder and O'Hanlon give Clinton and the allies high marks for realizing that NATO had to win or cease to be relevant and they stepped up to the challenge. Their critique of the Clinton Administration is decisive and thorough: "Having failed to make a public case for the use of force, the Clinton administration opted for a minimalist strategy. Its hope was that a bit of bombing would work. This was the military equivalent of the 'Hail Mary' play in football. Not only was this an irresponsible way to go to war, it also was unnecessary. A case for decisive military action-at a minimum, a robust air campaign from the war's outset--could have been made. The American public would probably have supported such a strategy given its disdain for Milosevic and memories of the Bosnian war. The tragedy of this case is that, in fearing the absence of public and congressional support, the administration embarked on the use of force lacking both. That is no basis for taking the tremendous risks that the use of force necessarily implies." (pages 224-225). This is a book worth studying and thinking about.

At slightly over 100 pages, this book, pamphlet really, is hardly worth its hefty price tag, particularly since the first 90 or so pages are an incredibly abbreviated and rather unobjective account of Tito's life and post-WW2 Yugoslav history. This summary-style makes it possible for Pavlowitch to make a number of sweeping generalizations and questionable statements without the need for backing his claims or citing evidence in footnotes. In a reductionist style suited to the book's format, Pavlowitch basically says that Tito was a rather unremarkable man of middling intelligence and ability who only achieved anything through a combination of cunning, conniving and luck. It is only in the last chapter (the only one worth reading by the way) that he concedes that Tito may have had some real political and diplomatic skills despite his many shortcomings. While I have nothing against demythologizing Tito and Titoism, this "reassessment" offers nothing new - the first cracks at the Tito myth were taken almost immediately after his death in the former Yugoslavia, while a number of non-Yugoslav scholars and analysts have produced excellent works that dissected the nature of Tito's seizure and maintenance of power. Pavlowitch's overall conclusion seems to place most of the blame for Yugoslavia's collapse squarely on Tito and the socialist system he set up - a point worth discussing - but he cites mainly superficial reasons for this. He also grossly oversimplifies the nature of the Yugoslav economy, which he seems to imply only remained viable due to massive Western support. In the end, despite extensive discussion of Tito's many failings, there is no real substanstial assessment of the actual failures of his leadership of the former Yugoslavia or the system he and his ruling clique set up. Also, Pavlowitch completely fails to account for Tito's charisma and the genuine affection that many in the former Yugoslavia felt, and still do feel, for him.

It is well written and informative, but reads more like a survey than a biography. It almost seems as if the book is written for journalists who need a crash course on Tito and some background information before they are shipped off to the Balkans to cover the latest mishaps of that region. Thus, the biography seems to short and feels lacking of details that would make the interpretation and understanding of certain events clearer. For example, more background and detail should have been put into Tito's relationships and subsequent breaks with Djilas and Rankovic or the purges of Inform Biro (Comintern) supporters after the break with Stalin. I also found the World War II chapters confusing and lacking in the explanation of the partisan and chetnik struggles against Germans, and their subsequent rivalry. From the limited information provided one is almost lured into viewing these two groups as two big groups caught into the 1940's version of a gang war.

Pavlowitch's 110-page overview gives an excellent account of Tito's early life, the development of his political acumen in the crucible of Comintern machinations in the 1920s and 30s, his slavish devotion to Stalinist ideals, and his stubborn adherence to his own closely-held vision for Yugoslavia. This vision was the integrating theme that maintained Yugoslav unity during his long rule, but it also contained the seeds of its own ruin in that Tito's inability to respond effectively to economic crises beginning in the mid-1960s and the subsequent societal disaffection with the Communist program gave sustenance to the nationalist fever which exploded in Croatia and Bosnia in 1992 and Kosovo in 1998.

Had Tito been a truly effective unifier, he would have done more than postpone the day of nationalist reckoning until ten years after his death, he would have addressed the fundamental forces underpinning nationalist yearnings.

This book provides an excellent look at Tito and his contributions to Yugoslavia. Pavlowitch is especially strong in his analysis of Communist party politics and Tito's schizophrenic relations with the Soviet Union. I only wish the author had provided a more detailed explanation of Tito's economic planning. The "self-management" economy receives only a dozen words of attention. It is difficult to fault Pavlowitch on this point after he heroically struggled to compress a mass of dense material into this fine short volume, but a cursory understanding of Yugoslav economic dynamics would be invaluable to a reader who might not buy another volume about the country. Surely a few paragraphs on economics would not stretch the book unreasonably.

On the nitpicking side, the book seems to have both British and American editors, as financial figures are given alternately in the British "$3,400 million" (p.77) and the American "$20-21 billion" (p.91). Also he sometimes assumes the reader has significant pre-knowledge, as when he introduces Tito's three senior lieutenants by last name only, "In the spring of 1938... he set up a provisional leadership around Djilas, Kardelj and Rankovic" (p.23) without providing further background on these individuals. I can only assume the relevant background material was left on the editing-room floor. However, these are quibbles, the book is excellent.

Friedman presents a well thought out, but disorganized history and analysis of the terrible conflicts faced by Yugoslavia, especially by the Muslims. With better writing skill, the material could make a great book.

Upon reading Dr. Francine Friedman's "The Bosnian Muslims," I now have a much greater understanding of the Bosnian War and Balkan Crisis. Though wordy at times, "The Bosnian Muslims" provides a thorough description of the history, exploitation, and violent confrontations of this volatile and troubled region.

Typical of post-modern, post-freudian analyses of pre-modern, pre-freudian socieities, Peasants and Communists reads motives and relations into World War II Yugoslav society that simply were not there. While the writer paints a thick veneer of sophistication over the simple goings-on of peasant discontent, the resulting painting fails to convince. Peasant revolt and agitation reflect discontent not with the theory behind power relations in a feudal state, but with the lack of sticking to them sufficiently. Peasants in most Indo-European countries know their rights to be limited, but that very limitation leads to ferocity when those rights are ignored, in the name of tyranny (Louis XIV) or progress (the Shah of Iran). Peasants and Communists locates the neuroses of upper West Side liberals into the tradition-bound psyches of religious peasants. It spins off brilliantly unlikely economic motives for peasant discontent. It fails to understand the real history and sociology behind the Communist-peasant alliance or the movement of peasant revolt itself....

....This is the statement of the selection committee for the Barbara Jelavich Prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in choosing Bokovoy's book for its 1999 award:

The Selection Committee (John Fine [chair], Istvan Deak, and Dennison Rusinow) unanimously award the 1999 Barbara Jelavich Prize to Melissa K. Bokovoy for her excellent Peasants and Communists: Politics and Ideology in the Yugoslav Countryside. 1941-1953 published by the Pittsburgh University Press. Dr. Bokovoy has produced an outstanding study on Yugoslav agrarian policy focusing on the post-war years, and especially on the matter of Collectivization from its launching to its repeal. She shows how peasant resistance was the main cause for the policy's abandonment, but also that the response of party members (local, republic, and federal) whose debates and responses (often negative) to particular initiatives were instrumental to the policy reversal. She demonstrates that there were great variations of opinion within the party and doubts about the policy were expressed by some from the start. She shows that many party leaders had great sympathy for the peasants (key members of the Partisan forces during the War) and that the party hierarchy was not dogmatic, but responsive to conditions on the ground and in the long run was willing to be moderate and base their agrarian policy on actual conditions and not on Marxist theory. The material on local peasant and local party responses in the correspondence/reports from the local and republic party leaders to the higher echelons as well as articles in the party press that she presents both fascinate and support thoroughly her well-balanced conclusions. An outstanding study marked both by empathy and a thorough understanding of her subject and sources. Dr. Bokovoy's work shows once again (this time in agrarian policy) how different and flexible Tito and his party were when compared to Communist parties elsewhere.

This is the only book which attempts to comprehensively report the activities of the ICTR and ICTY. It does not do that real well. It is poorly organized and difficult to wade through.

An essential guide to the case-law of the ICTY and ICTR. Also highly useful for those working on the International Criminal Court.

As an avid reader about the problems, which have plagued the Balkans throughtout the 90s I found the book to be both informative from a personal narrative perspective, but tiresome from the repeated diatribes directed towards those who were not pro-Bosniac. While little argument can be made against the documented atrocities committed against the city of Sarajevo, no effort was made to look at the Bosnian-Muslim leadership and their role/complicity in the conflict. For anyone interested in the personal tragedies faced by those who lived in the city while under siege, it is a great story. Overall though, I thought the book was diminished by the often-repeated diatribes against just about anyone connected with the then-ongoing peace talks (Vance-Owen), or the UNPROFOR mission.

I enjoyed reading "The testimony of a Bosnian" because it was not only a realistic portrayal of the Serb's aggression on Bosnia but was also very informative. I only did not agree on one statement, and that is the claim that, before the aggression, Bosnian Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox citizens lived in tolerance and peace with each other. There have always been problems in this country and people have been treated unequally all the time because of their religious preference. Even now, after the war, there is hardly any improvement. Still, I would definitely recommend the book - great historic facts and easy to read and understand.

A very theoretical study by a liberal intellectual. Rejects economic determinism and the idea that 'the Balkans are different', but reduces everything to 'ethnic strategies' and 'power structures', and seems not to notice any difference between a peaceful 'break-up' and a war of territorial conquest

The book is a deep and insightful look at the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Unlike most books on this topic it is written with grace and style. It is a pleasure to read. The book sidesteps the usual interpretations of the war in the Balkans and aims straight for the real issues.

...reading this book. Despite her claims of being a "highly experienced specialist on international affairs" and something of an authority on Yugoslavia and its political scene, the late Nora Beloff wrote a book that is just another contribution to the vast body of propaganda on the Yugoslav conflict published over the last ten years. One would at least expect some new insights or arguments from this self-proclaimed specialist, but she provides no substantial information nor background, nor does she give readers even a perfunctory understanding of the Yugoslav wars and their terrible consequences. Beloff seems to go out of her way to exonerate Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic of responsibility for the crimes committed by his regime and on behalf of the aggressive Serbian nationalism he stirred up during the late 1980s. The grosteque Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb Army are similarly whitewashed. On the other hand, the Bosnian Muslims and especially the Croats (who become interchangeable with the word "Ustasha" in the course of the book) are to blame for almost everything. Much of the propaganda published by the Yugoslav Information Ministry is more convincing that Beloff's mindless diatribes in this book. In his foreward to the book, Richard Body lambasts Western commentators for allegedly adhering to the formula "Bosnia and Croatia, good; Serbia, bad." All this little pamphlet does is turn the formula around: "Serbia, good; Bosnia and Croatia, bad." Such moronic simplicity may make good sense for narrow-minded propaganda campaigns, but it does nothing more in reality than foment further misunderstanding and prejudices.

I respect the opinion of the person who wrote the review before me, but I urge you to read the book. I understand why Edo would not like the book. It is much different than anything else you can find in USA. The book shows the other side of the war and clearly states that there were three waring parties there. The book is filled with facts that show the numbers of serbian refugees from Bosnia (40%) which has been hidden to the West. The book gives a good idea of what really happened and all the reasons why the three nations didn't want to live together anymore. In any case, I can say that I feel wiser for have read it. Thank you.

Generally I stopped reading books on the Balkans and the former Yugoslavia written by passersby (or perhaps a better word would be "passers-through") a few years ago because they are largely uninformative and self-serving. The only reason I picked this one up is because I met and briefly spoke with the author in Zagreb in late 1992. He made a very favorable impression on me; I found him quite intelligent and likable, and was therefore interested in his account of his trips to the Balkans. I wish I hadn't bothered. "Only the Nails" differs little from books written by various superficial journalists, writers, poets and other "truth-seekers." It follows the general framework established by Robert Kaplan's inane "Balkan Ghosts" and continued in various forms by Peter Maass, Janine DiGiovanni, Martin Bell and scores of others. To his credit, Merrill faithfully reproduces the many conversations he held with friends and acquaintances in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, etc. and some of these are very interesting. However, this hardly makes up for the book's glaring shortcomings: from factual errors that riddle the entire book (e.g. the frequent misspelling of place-names, inaccurate dates or misplacing of events) to the author's forays into history which are often misleading (e.g. he says Serbia started both of the pre-WWI Balkans Wars, which is untrue; or Bulgaria only gained independence in 1908, again, not completely accurate). Much of this could have been corrected by less-indulgent editors and even the most perfunctory consultation of dictionaries, atlases, encyclopedias or the very sources cited in Merrill's bibliography - which he obviously read quite superficially. Also troubling was Merrill's tendency, at least in Croatia, to play the typical war tourist, getting some knowledgable locals to take him close to the frontlines so he could observe wartime destruction and its sorrowful victims (playing guide to ignorant and often obnoxious free-lance reporters and photographers is something in which I have quite a bit of experience). He even has the cheek to say he became "bored" with the (understandable) bitterness of his two Croatian guides, both of whom had first-hand experience of Croatia's bloody and now largely forgotten war in 1991. In fact, the motive for his frequent trips to Sarajevo go largely unexplained, except that the author at some level liked the rush of being in a city under siege (he indirectly admits this toward the end of the book). In the end, this book is just a mish-mash of the author's impressions, which offer little in the way of explaining anything, much less the underlying causes or motivations that led to the Third Balkan War.

The previous review, by someone who admits to not reading the book, should be wholly discounted. Although no current book on the Balkans can compete with Robert D. Kaplan's incomparable "Balkan Ghosts," Christopher Merrill eloquently describes the mood, psychology, and turmoil of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. I only wish that the book were a bit heavier on the historical background. However, it is refreshing to read a more human account of the effects of post-modern progress than the usual detached historical rendering. Merrill's work is to be praised, an attitude which can only be adopted after actually reading the book.

Readers of Merrill's book will find it useful for making sense of the events in the former Yugoslavia -- a region with too much history for its own good. Anyone who questioned how neighbors could end up at opposite ends of a gun will find answers here. Merrill explores cultural history -- the stories and sentiments that bind a people despite the political borders -- as he seeks to answer for himself how such barbaric and senseless destruction could happen. This book offers insights rarely found in contemporary writings on the Balkans.

This is a great book if you prefer to hear the Serb version of the Bosnian War and the Kosovo conflict. Sremac does a great job of painting a picture of innocent Serbs and blood-thirsty Muslims and Croats. She condemns Western media for their "tendencies" to report from only one side(Muslims and Albanians), yet she nelects to find error with the reporting of the wars from the Serb propaganda machine in Belgrade. This book goes so far to claim that the death toll of Muslims and Croats was exaggerated and that the seige of Sarajevo was more detrimental to the innocent Serbs rather than the many citizens who lost their lives on Sniper Alley . The Serb mentality of Us Against the World is blatantly lined through all aspects of this book.

This book by Danielle Sremac is an important historical document. It explains clearly and objectively the political origin of the war and the German "drang nach Osten" initiative to break up Yugoslavia into small captive markets. Germany was allowed to excersize its hegemony under the "laissez faire" received from the United States in 1990 and maintained the dominant role in the Balkans until the mid-nineties when the Clinton Government took over as the main war protagonist. The document is factual, scholarly and easy to read. It cites innumerable reliable sources and does not indulge in speculation. The author leaves to the reader to decide which were the real reasons leading President Clinton to violate the United Nations Charter by attacking a friendly, sovereign nation, ally of the United States in both World Wars. However, Sremac demonstrates that "moral duty" invoked by the administration as the official motive for the mass bombing of Kosovo and Serbia, came as an afterthought and was nothing more than "moral" posturing. The Sremac book is must-reading for all those who wish to understand the events in the Balkans between 1990 and 1999. But,the study deserves an even wider audience, as its importance transcends the historical and educational value. It treats, directly and indirectly a matter of great importance for all of us, Americans interested in defending true democracy against manipulations of the people's will by the Government's spin control masters. It shows how great is the danger when the official propaganda machine succeeds in enlisting the help of the media trough subtle and not so subtle misrepresentations, as was the case with the war against Yugoslavia. The book leaves us pondering what Naum Chomsky once said : "Propaganda for a democracy is what violence is for a dictatorship".

Sremac concisely and without any sign of "nationalism" documents the campaign which led to the breakup of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Those of us who have closely followed these events have had our memories refreshed. It is to be hoped that those who were totally sold on the media version may once they have read the book enjoy a change of perception of these events. The book can certainly act as a primer to assist readers in translation of popular media stories in the future.