Can we understand the history of a nation by looking its leaders? Political biographies seek to explore the public and private lives of presidents,prime ministers, etc. and thus try to enhance our understanding of historical events. Similarly, Pavkovic's and Radan's collection of essays on Serbs and their leaders highlights some aspects and 'present new perspectives' (p.vii) on the history of Serbs. Already the selection of 'leaders' covered by this volume indicates some of the problems associated with such an approach, as the editors concede. Of the eight biographical chapter, seven cover kings, generals and other Serbian leaders of the firsthalf of the 20th century, the essay on Slobodan Milosevic stands alone to represent the second half of the century. Did Serbs have no leaders between 1945 and 1988? Obviously Communist Yugoslavia, despite the predominant role played by Tito for its first three and a half decades, possessed a number of Serbian politicians in leading positions, besides Milovan Djilas and Aleksander Rankovic, both mentioned by the editors: Latinka Perovic and Marko Nikezic during the 'liberal' phase in the late sixties and early seventies, as well as later on Dragoslav Markovic, Petar and Ivan Stambolic in the seventies and early eighties. Leaving out these leaders insinuates the wide-spread perception that post-war Yugoslavia was ruled against and not with the participation of Serbs. Finally, the question remains, of whether Tito was a Serb leader. The renaming of the bulevar Tito into bulevar Srpskih Vladara (Serbian Leaders) in downtown Belgrade has given rise to the joke that actually the name did not change at all-nobody ruled longer over the Serbs than Tito. Similarly, one has to question the 'ethnic' definition of leaders in the volume, which eventually obscures a significant chapter of Serbian history. If one is to exclude Tito, the title of the book would be more appropriately called "Serb Leaders in the 20th century" The tone of the different chapters varies greatly. Some take a distinctive national(ist) tone, accepting explicitly or implicitly the premises of national historiography, such as Branislav Gligorijevic's chapter of Alkesandar Karadjordjevic ('King Aleksandar was a national king in a sense that cannot be applied to any European monarch going back centuries. He was of pure Serbian blood on both sides of the family, proud of his peasant origins ...', p.140), or Kosta Nikolic's chapter on Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovic, which devotes more space to the reasons why Britain 'betrayed' the Chetniks than their atrocities. Others, such as Lenard Cohen's, tries to paint a more differentiated picture. The chapter on Slobodan Milosevic by Cohen offers some interesting insights, unfortunately, however, restricts itself to the period of his rise and refrains from discussing the politics of Milosevic, once in power. Cohen's analysis is important in terms of identifying the instrumentalization of nationalism and pointing out that nationalism, just like communism provided an adequate tool for Milosevic in his quest to preserve his personal power. Other chapters discuss Nikola Pasic, Dragutin-Dimitrijevic-Apis, King Petar Karadjordjevic, Radomir Putnik, Prince Pavle and Karadjordjevic. Returning to the original question, we have to note that the (short) biographies of political and military leaders only help to supplement, but not replace a general history of Serbian history in the 20th century (which is still lacking in English). Considering, that Serbs have spent seven decades of this century in Yugoslavia, increases the need to consider a history of leaders in the larger context of the first and second Yugoslavia.

I don't agree with the other reader who emphasizes the uneven distribution of figures presented here: Western readers know far, far less about the pre-World War II period in Serbia and which is a master key to what would follow: American and Central European history books leave out much too much, in fact nearly everthing that would be important in the World War II and post-war period. This pathetically biased treatment against Serbia in the American history books can be viewed as in part rebalanced in this book and also for that reason this is worth reading! The more I read in this area, the more shocked I am in what we have read in High School history texts and at University.

What can be said of a person who hangs around a gang of killers for years? Ron Haviv has done just this. Fear and death become trivialized when expensive and stylized books become available for the commercial market.
There are photographs that exist from the past that document murder. These photographs were made by the murderers themselves in order to celebrate their deeds or by the victims in an attempt to warn the world of the horrors that had taken place.
Haviv was neither a victim nor a spy taking photographs on the sly from the distance. Haviv was in the middle of this carnage. He was the court photographer for a twisted band of murderers, winning their confidence over a period of years. He did not attempt to stop the crimes, he photographed them instead. He did not run from this vicious mob but instead he chose to remain with them.
In the book he is referred to as having been brave. I choose to think of him as an opportunist of the highest degree. Shame!!

I have always enjoyed Haviv's beautiful photographs. He has an incredible eye. But the text in this book is very poor. Sudetic comes across as a Yugo-nostalgic fool. Once again the writer uses myths from World War Two as justification for the present day conflict. If we are going to bring up WW2 then lets also bring up Serb duplicity and collaboration with the Nazis. (See the Nedic regime). As well as the whole slaughter of non-Serbs, primarily Muslims and Croats by the Chetnik forces of Serb General Mihajlovic, prior to 1941. The writer does not take into account Communist Tito's massacres at Bleiburg, and the death camps such as Goli Otok and Gradiska. (For comparisons see Pinochet). Yugoslavia was not a utopian dream. It was a vicious state ruled with an iron fist and it was bound to fall apart. It was a regime ruled by one ethnic group, the Serbs, and several non-Serb cronies who were die-hard Communists. War was tragically inevitable. How could it not be, when the Serb leader Milosevic and other Serb intellectuals, wanted to carve out a Greater Serbia. (See Memorandum from the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences). And almost succeeded. What was unforseen was the West's desperate attempt to keep Yugoslavia whole. This goes back to interest and types like former Sec. of State Lawrence Eagleburger having money/investments in the region.
What gives larger nations the right to 'allow' smaller nations autonomy? Thank God these countries are now independent. We can only hope the illegally annexed provinces of Vojvodina and Kosova can finally break free from Serb repression in the coming years.
Haviv, next time get a better writer who knows more than the usual regurgitated Communist rhetoric. I mean would you write a book on the Ukraine with a Soviet?

It's hard top describe or explain, but the very impact of the horrific photos and the tender essays which accompany them add substantially to the overall beauty of the work. This is definitely something to leave on the coffee table, with the expectation of rousing some stirring (possibly controversial) conversation.

Haviv's displaying a tremendous ability to see through the "fog of war" that has routinely plagued journalists (photojournalists and written word journalists) since the American Civil War. His eye for the poignant photo speaks, as a picture is supposed to, thousands of words; his words paint the pictures far more deeper than what the superficial eye can see.

This is as important a document of the Balkan War, or of war in general, as has ever been put to print. The price of the book should not be considered too daunting - the price of war, however, should be.

Although the concept of 'Greater Serbia' is an interesting one and an important as well this is not the book to read on the topic. It is produced by the Croatian Ministry of Information and is an extremely nationalistic and biased account of the issue of 'Greater Serbia'.

The unmasking of Serbian pathological drive for domination and grandomania are well documented in this book.We're given the eyes to see "heart of darkness" out of which maelstrom of Serbian mass murder whirled.A must read with only one flaw: partial bias of its Croatian editors.Yet, the words(ie.Serbian words) speak for themselves.

This book only depicts how a proud people serbians once were. The only reason why so many people have a hard time with this book is because of the current situation in Serbia today. Every nation in the world is proud of who they are but people only seem to have a problem with us. If you dont belive me read one of the manuscripts for the Bosnian Muslim- Jihad, nobody seems to have any problems with this book. Even though its one of the most disgusting things i have ever read.

General MacKenzie has written a horrible book. His involvment, and role in the conflict are still being questioned. Just a remainder that he was retired immediately after he was fired from Bosnia. During his tours through USA, it was discovered that he recieived money from the Serbian lobby in Canada and US. Does anything else need to be said?

Gen Mackenzie has pretty much seen and done it all when it comes to UN peacekeeping operations. From fairly innocuous duty in the Sinai, to a more complex situation in Cyprus and Central America, to the ultimate test for the UN--the Balkans.
Gen Mackenzie's insights also highlight how the UN has adapted (or failed to adapt) to the growing complexities of multinational peacekeeping, in an age where superpower rivalries are no longer able to keep warring factions in check.

Worthy of note is the battle Mackenzie faced dealing not only with the warring factions in Bosnia, but also the warring faction's ability to utilize the omnipresent media to shape public opinion.
Mackenzie's story of the beginning of UNPROFOR should be mandatory reading for those attempting to pursue multinational peacekeeping efforts in a complex, multiethnic environment.

Good anecdotes, and a very enjoyable read

I found the two previous reviews, one by Michael Smith and the other by an unidentified reader, both mean-spirited and uninformed. The latter reader I will disregard because his anonymity makes him unworthy of comment.

First, I wonder why it took Smith 6 years to get around to reading MacKenzie's book? That's 6 years of hindsight that the author never had, so any abberations could be seen as dated.

Next, was Smith there in Sarajevo when the Serb artillery was reducing the beautiful Olympic city to ruins? Did he know how it felt to try and communicate with the UN in New York only to have a recording because the staff was home for the weekend?

Canadians have always been rated highly as peacekeepers because they come from a society that is judged as fair and tolerant of all peoples. The accusations of religious and ethnic intolerance are surprising - but maybe because of having to duck bullets and shells one sometimes loses this trait.

I think Smith and his ilk would be happy if Canadians stayed home when the next trouble spot happens in Europe. Then Smith can watch from his Paris address while his EU compatriots try and solve the problem. Because, after two world wars and dozens of peacekeeping campaigns where thousands of Canadians have died, it's time for Europe to handle its own problems.

General MacKenzie probably made a lot of enemies during his command. But outside of ethnic communities, one would be hardpressed to find a person who doesn't think highly of this man.

And next time, Smith, read the book when it comes out.

many people that are obviously lapping it up as well researched truth. What we have here is rehashed Croatian & Vatican propaganda that can be easily refuted by any serious, unbiased, scholarly college freshman.

Mr. Anzulovic, a Croatian nationalist has written a book only a croat nationalist could write. One which essentially blames all the Balkans troubles on the Serbs. In that classic Balkan style, he simply omits any reference to Croatian crimes and builds a simplistic and at times, erroneous case against Serbs. The fact that the entire Serbian community was eradicated by Croatia in 1995 - a full 50 years after Nazi Croatia tried to do in in WWII, is avoided. Anzulovic chooses to ignore the details and simply parrots Zagrebs party propganda line.

I was well impressed by this book. Unfortunately, I am a bit troubled by the negative reviews that a number of other reviewers have given this book. No doubt, many of them are from people of Serbian or Orthodox decent. Regretablly, even some of the most open-minded Serbs and Greeks that I know tend to downplay the ugliness that is a part of our past, probably because it is a threat to their sense of identity in some way. I guess every culture has that though to some extent, I am ashamed of America's failure to come to terms with the genocide against Native Americans over the last 500 years, and the conditions they live today. Many Americans may just find it too troubling to come to terms with the fact that this nation was partially built on the blood of its indigenious peoples (as well as African slaves). That is a dark side of America's past many would rather forget. The same hold's true for Serb's and their history.

The author did a very impressive job exposing the deep roots of Serbia's national myths, which has fed an exlusivist ethnic based nationalism derived from a medieval rather than modern notion of a nation. I found his evidence very persuasive in most respects.

However, I do agree with many of the critics though that the book was weaker for failing to stress much on the Ustasa regime and the atrocities committed by the present day Tudjman-HDZ regime, which played a signifcant role in the current polarized climate (in other words, Milosevic and Serbs are not to be blamed entirely, although they are of primary responsiblity for the region's suffering). However, that does not mean this book is not without scholarly merit. Afterall, the book was about Serbs and their myths, not Croats, Bosniaks or Albanians.

I can only assume that some of the readers below who say this book is very "anti-Serbian," etc. have simply not read the book or superficially skimmed through it. As a number of academic reviewers have noted, this book in fact gives more credence to Serbian historical claims about Kosovo than the Albanian ones. For example, Vickers tends to accept the Serbian view that most Albanians in Kosovo today are descended from Serbs who were forced to convert to Islam in the distant past. In fact, I think Vickers should be commended for really making an effort to be impartial between the conflicting claims of Albanian and Serbian nationalists. However, this effort is marred by her superficial approach: she tends to rely too much on secondary sources, and cites, often at length, excerpts from other books without critically analyzing these sources (i.e. at several points she very uncritically cites Serbian nationalist "historian" Dusan Batakovic). Although the overview of events in the last two decades is quite comprehensive and informative, there are many places where Vickers cites questionable figures or incidents of interethnic violence in Kosovo (sometimes nothing more than rumors) without backing this up with evidence. Again, it seems as though she depended too much on secondary sources and even propaganda materials published by either of the two sides. This is important, because this book, with its emphasis on recent events, could have been a very informative source for readers who want to learn more about Kosovo and why it has become a major crisis region.

BETWEEN SERB AND ALBANIAN offers a much more intelligent and balanced treatment of Kosovo than the superficial and biased KOSOVO, A SHORT HISTORY by Noel Malcom. Vickers concentrates on the events of this century, and recognizes the complexity of the present situation. The suppression of Albanians by the Serbian government is documented, but also documented is the terrorism against the Serbs of Kosovo by the Albanian extremists. The Albanians' inability to do much with the autonomy they once held, and the deep divisions within the Albanian political factions which led to the emergence of the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army lead the reader to the conclusion that independence would be a disaster, and the only hope for an end to the misery of the region is some sort of compromise with Kosovo remaining as a province of Serbia. Vickers finds this improbable as long as Miloševic remains in power, leaving the reader rather hopeless. Nevertheless, this work provides information, balance, and insight. Kosovo is treated in context of the broader regional and world events which influence, and are influenced by events there. I recommend this book to anyone seeking an impartial look at Kosovo.

I've been following and working on the Kosovo situation for over two years. I have read many books and articles on the Balkans and especially Kosovo. I first read Ms. Vickers book in the Fall of 1998. Her writing is clear and concise. She does not confuse the writer with useless terminology that only academics dabble in to demonstrate how "intellectual" they are. Ms. Vickers book is, for the most part, impartial and represents discrepancies on both sides. All sides in Kosovo have myths about their past, this is something not uncommon to nations and people throughout the world. Ms. Vickers demonstrates how these myths have led to Serbian Nationalism and to Albanian reactionarism and the effects these beliefs have had on Kosovo. So, in closing, if you want to gain an understanding into how the events in Kosovo developed, then read Ms. Vickers book.

For an informative and un biased read on the Kosovo and balkan issue, there are much better books out there than this one. For one, you're well more than half way through the book before the author even gets to the Kosovo issue, although the first part is a fairly unbiased quick refresher of the last century's wars. Once the author finally does get to the Kosovo topic, it is a quick and uninformative heavily biased review that hardly reflects on the true issues of Kosovo, Serbia and the former republics of Yugoslavia. To save you the time of reading it i'll lay out the most ignorant statement in the book: from page 190: "If the US and NATO had not intervened, the Serbs would have settled the Kosovo issue, by ethnic cleansing. The Kosovars would have been pushed into Albania and forcibly reunited with their own people. Kosovo would be owned and inhabited exclusively by Serbs. Monstrous though it would have been to let the Milosevic regime profit from its crimes, it would all be over." Right. And the humanitarian disasters in Macedonia and Albania which hardly have the means to support their own people? The Turkish-Kurd, Spanish-Basque, Albanian-Greek issues that may be affected by such an outcome? It would be over according to this author. Common ignorance from people that weren't there or don't really know. For a good read on Balkan topics i suggest 'Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation', KOSOVO or BOSNIA by Noel Malcholm. For a good read on the atrocities of what goes on in that part of the world how about any chronology of Srebrenica.

I found Fromkin's writing style to be unorganized. He has a lot of information to give (not all of which is dependable, by the way), but he skips around from the 20th century to the Middle Ages to all the time periods in-between, and quite frankly, I found it a bit hard to follow at times.
Fromkin is very confident about his information, and seems to think he's a definitive source on the subject. The book left me with a feeling that I was learning from an expert in Balkan politics--but beware. As a soldier stationed in the Balkans I can tell you, that if you're basing your knowledge of this region off of this book--or any one book--you've only really scratched the surface.

I have read many similar books before.

The book itself has very little to do with Kososvo at all. Tito for example gets less then a page. The way he ruled maybe a line. That he ruled by killing over a million Yugoslavians is never even mentioned.

It is a study basically of the history of US foreign policy. Nothing very orginal or good either. Just some sweeping generalisations that would suggest that US foreign policy is purely a produce of the ideals of the current US president.

Mira Markovic is the wife of Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian ex-strongman responsible for the atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo. She was the driving force behind his most ruthless and effective actions, and has her own political party. As a dedicated Communist with powerful family connections, she had no problem obtaining a doctorate in sociology at the state university in Nis. She has published several bad books. Two are available at Amazon.com: "Night and Day" and "Answer". They have not been popular in the US. However, you may notice two positively gushing 5-star Customer Reviews. Her other Amazon book has two similar 5-star reviews. Apparently written by four different Americans, all four reviews were posted on the same day, November 16, 1999. Makes me go "Hmm...!" ;-)

Mira Markovic is the wife of Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian ex-strongman responsible for the atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo. She was the driving force behind his most ruthless and effective actions, and has her own political party. As a dedicated Communist with powerful family connections, she had no problem obtaining a doctorate in sociology at the state university in Nis. She has published several bad books. Two are available at Amazon.com: "Night and Day" and "Answer". They have not been popular in the US. However, you may notice two positively gushing 5-star Customer Reviews. Her other Amazon book has two similar 5-star reviews. Apparently written by four different Americans, all four reviews were posted on the same day, November 16, 1999. Makes you go "Hmm...!" ;-)

Markovic comes out smelling like a goddess in this testimony tothe complexity, irony and debilitating nature of propandada. For thisreason of shedding light on the insidious nature of propaganda, I award the unwitting Ms. Markovic highest honors. END

This is NOT simply a set of articles criticising NATO's 1999 assault on Serbia. Rather, its contributors appear horrified with the very thought of human empathy for the oppressed Albanian people of Kosovo on the part of Western observers. They count corpses, deny atrocities and minimise suffering to the point where it appears almost as though life for the Albanians in Milosevic's Kosovo was actually pretty rosy. There is a great deal of insincerity here. Thus Mick Hume professes concern at comparisons between Milosevic and Hitler: they involve minimising the unique horror of the Holocaust, he says. This is a bit rich coming from someone who spent much of the 1990s equating the Croats and Germans of today with the Nazis. Diana Johnstone views the Serbs almost as a kind of 'chosen people' whom she imbues with mystical powers of resistence to her imaginary Western imperialist conspiracies. After reading this book, I do not believe that even if Milosevic really had exterminated six million people in gas chambers the reaction of these authors would have been any different. Whatever next ? Perhaps a sequel claiming that the Taliban were great feminists and that their atrocities against women were the invention of the Western media...

The best story is how the Serb parliament passed a resolution just before the war started accepting a peaceful solution. What kind of naivete allows one to give credibility to a parliament dominated by Milosevic cronies, one that supported genocide in Croatia and Bosnia? Does the author not know what happened in Bosnia, where the Serbs behaved like patholigical liars, fooling the West into believing them, then killing 250,000 people? Does the author recall how the British, to him the leaders of anti-Serb propaganda, from day one appeased the Serbs in Bosnia, and only reluctantly got involved in the Balkans? It is pathetic how persons can ignore common sense in order to write something different. It is so boring to rest one's laurels on breaking percieved conformist thinking, while abandoning inteligent ethical commentary in the process. Serbs will love this book, as will people who lack the ability to distinguish right from wrong. Chomskyism is becoming too morally confused to be relevant any longer. This boring author should have been made to spend a year in Vukovar, Sarajevo or Pristina when they were under Serb domination. Read Noel Malcom's "Kososo: a Short History."

This is the best book yet on the NATO aggression of March-June 1999. It also studies the media coverage of the war. The first part consists of four essays on the background to the war, David Chandler's essay, Western intervention and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 1989-1999, being outstanding. The second and third parts comprise fourteen essays on media coverage around the world, including a brilliant essay on CNN's role as NATO's mouthpiece. Unfortunately, however, there is no essay studying the huge popular opposition to the war in Europe and America.

This was NATO's first war, and it attacked a sovereign country with no UN authorisation. It showed itself as an alliance with no legal or geographic limits, in which the USA and Germany quarrelled like rats in a sack. To trigger the war, the US government demanded that NATO forces occupy the whole country. As a US official said, "We intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to comply. They need some bombing, and that's what they are going to get."

It was also the EU's war. From 1990, the EC intervened in Yugoslavia's internal affairs, aiding those seeking to secede. Its recognition of Yugoslavia's seceding republics breached international law, precipitating war. The EU's social democratic governments embrace capital, 'the market' and big business: their enemy is nationalism, politics, demonised as the source of all evil.

Germany, the USA, Austria and Albania armed the Kosovo Liberation Army. In early 1998, the KLA's first major attack provoked a Serb crackdown. NATO claimed that the Serbs killed 100,000 people. Later the International Criminal Tribunal of The Hague counted 2,500 dead. The NATO bombing killed 2,600 people. Who should be tried for war crimes?

After the war, the US Congress voted $100 million to 'independent' forces in former Yugoslavia, seeking its further disintegration. NATO was supposed to disarm the KLA and to protect Serbs and Roma Gypsies in Kosovo. But it has allowed the KLA to kill more than 200 Serbs and to expel 240,000 Serbs and 90,000 Roma.

The important question one has to ask before picking up this book is why anyone would feel confortable relying on the opinion of a commentator whose name was so closely associated with the word "appeasement" when war and genocide were raging in Bosnia. The fact that Ignatieff was one of the equivocators who had little to chose between Karadzic and Mladic and their victims will taint him the rest of his life.
Ironicaly, he is now advertised as a human rights scholar, albeit a human rights scholar who opposed intervation to stop the Serb sponsored genocide in Bosnia, which took 250,000 lives and culminated in the masacre of Srebrenica. Ignatieff now has the good sense to change his tone, even though Kosovo presents no stronger a case for intervention than Bosnia did. This is the overiding question that Ignatieff does not answer. Why does he now support intervention within the sovereignty of a state, and yet opposed it when Bosnia was attacked in a trans-state conflict? The answer is clear, he has realized the error of his ways, a matter that Ignatieff should have the courage the face up to. It would make for an interesting book or article: the well meaning, often Serb biased Yugoslav experts who, when confronted with the worst human rights abuses seen in Europe since the Second World War, fumbled the ball miserably.
Overall, not a very engaging book, from a discredited personality, who failed the Bosnians miserably.

I bought this book a couple of years ago but did not get around to reading it until last week, shortly after the war in Iraq ended (more or less). I was curious to see what kind of perspective it would offer not only on the Kosovo campaign but on the war in Iraq. I found it both a useful refresher on a very different battle, the 79 day air campaign against Serbia, and an interesting meditation on modern war.

The front end of this book consists of a series of snapshots of different aspects of the war, along with a couple of arguments Ignatieff has with fellow intellectuals. Several reviewers on this site wrote that they couldn't see the connection between these bits of reportage with the latter half of the book, which is an extended essay on aspects of modern, "virtual" war. I think they're perhaps not trying very hard, as the longer essay quite obviously tackles in a disciplined fashion the themes raised in the reportage--international law, the revolution in military affairs, values, societal support or the lack thereof for political decisions to move toward war.

Ignatieff is often clear-thinking. It is a bit startling to read this book, written in 1999-2000, talking about the merits of regime change in places like Iraq and Serbia/FRY. He is likewise prophetic in noting how the revolution in military affairs created an incentive for the Saddams of the world to seek a countervailing military threat in the form of chemical and biological weapons.

Where he is perhaps a bit less far-sighted is in failing to see that the precedent of a "virtual war" in Kosovo--by which he means a zero-casualty, low-cost war (for the attacking side only, of course), that is not legitimised by international law or blessed by the kind of domestic support that must be whipped up to permit a high-cost, full mobilization "real war", with real casualties on both sides--could be used to support not only human rights' causes but narrower interests.

Overall this is a book well worth reading. I'd recommend it to anyone interested in understanding what goes into a modern war.

Clearly Michael Ignatieff is a gifted writer, but the theme throughout this book did not string together that well. Ignatieff had some great insights into the diplomacy building up to the Kosovo air campaign (i.e. gaining valuable insight into Holbrooke's shuttle diplomacy), but some of the observations, particularly those in the last chapter beg questioning.

The repercussions of a zero casualty conflict will reverberate throughout the US defense establishment for years to come and will certainly set benchmarks, warranted or not for future conflicts. But sacrifice in battle will be supported by the American public if the situation warrants. The war in Afghanistan bears this point out to an extent.

The dialogue between Skidelsky and Ignatieff was interesting, as was the return of Ignatieff to Belgrade to meet his longtime friend Aleksa Djilas. This dialogue portrayed the extent to which people such as Skidelsky and Djilas would like to look past the atrocities committed by the like of Milosevic, at the expense of Western intervention.

I rated the book three stars only because I didnt see the common thread throughout the book...merely a series of collected essays that may or may not have had anything to do with the subject "virtual war". THe book does add some interesting insight into Holbrooke's dealings with Milosevic, but could have delved more into discussions with Gen Clark and perhaps Lt Gen Mike Short, the Joint Forces AIr Component Commander, on the extent the "virtual war" was or was not fought both on the battlefield, in the media and in the political realm.