When I was young, my grandmother gave this book to me. Although I was an avid reader, at first I didn't want to read a story about someone with a strange name in a strange land, but eventually I did read it. Once I picked it up, I couldn't put it down. I must have read this story a hundred times. This enterprizing girl enchanted me. She worked hard, and never had any of the finer things, like toys or icecream or shoes. I was impressed how she took a difficult situation, and turned it into an opportunity do something kind for her mother, and eventually create a new life for her under-priveledged family. What a wonderful book - riviting, but still manages to instill great values along the way.

This book is an English translation of "Ajmo, ajde, svi u setnju," which was released before six months had passed from the end of the 1996-1997 demonstrations. A group of the most distinguished social scientists in Belgrade, together with their students, researched the student and political protests of the winter as they were happening, providing in short order a work that is both a rigorous analysis and a contemporaneous document of the protests. It is essential material for anybody who wants to understand who were the participants in the longest continuous political protest, and what they believed.

This is a really great, and thoroughly sad book about what happened in Bosnia in the early-mid 90's during the war. It focuses primarily on Sarajevo and it's time under siege by the Serbs. Janine Di Giovanni adds the element of peoples' personal stories and struggles during the war (and after, for some), which helps really bring it a lot closer and puts a face on what people were actually going through, and how the horrors of war affected them. They are also her personal stories as well. She did cover what happened in a few other towns outside of Sarajevo as well, in particular, Mostar, the city of a once beautiful and age-old bridge.
It concentrates almost entirely on the experiences of the Bosnian-Muslim population, since they were the ones under siege in Sarajevo. She does mention a few encounters with Serbs, none positive.
Another element I really am glad she included, was some of the history, as cursory as it was and had to be for such short book, it was enough gain a very basic understanding of what happened and a slightly better idea why.
Finally, she brings in the point that the world stood by so long and watched what was happening, and what human beings, once again, and tragically so, were doing to each other. She makes it so personal, to our benefit, so it's not just news anymore, ordinary people, like you and me, in extrodinary circumstances, and it made me wonder what it would have been like had it been me and family and friends suffering.

In Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia, editor G. Scott Davis compiles essays by five professors of religious ethics who consider the current Bosnian conflict within the schema of the "just war" theory. This "just war" tradition, as described by noted theorists Paul Ramsey and Michael Walzer, outlines the "just" reasons for engaging in warfare, and the proper manner in which war should be conducted. The former includes proper authority, just cause, just intent, last resort, and reasonable hope of success. The latter pertains to the use of proportion and discrimination in the prosecution of warfare (16).
Davis admits that, before undertaking this project, he "had scant knowledge of the cultural and political history of Eastern Europe, much less of the Balkans" (viii). Davis assumed the role of a student in preparation for this enterprise by consulting such works as Fred Singleton's "A Short History of the Yugoslav People" and Barbara Jelavich's two-volume history on the Balkans. Two convictions on the part of Davis enters into this work--a distrust of nationalism, and an insistence that the West (particularly, the United States) should intervene militarily to end the hostilities against the Bosnian Muslims.

Michael Sells' contribution to the study, "Religion, History, and Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina," is a critical account on Western views towards the Balkans. First, Sells establishes that war tactics on the part of the Bosnian Serbs is, in fact, genocide. The "unjust" intent of the Bosnian Serbs is to destroy the cultural memory of the Bosnian Muslims (26). Second, Sells analyzes the prevailing attitude of the West towards the war in Bosnia. Sells cites an appearance by then president Bill Clinton on Larry King Live during which Clinton referred to the hostilities in Bosnia as "age-old antagonisms" which "go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years" (23).
Robert Kaplan's "Balkan Ghosts" is criticized for repopularizing the idea that the Balkan peoples and cultures are "unamenable to civilized standards of behavior and locked in unchanging, perpetual tribal hatreds" (40). This belief that the Balkan peoples will always be involved in warfare is coupled with the idea that "there are no angels in the conflict" (41). According to Sells, the denial that civilized society is possible in the Balkans, and the prevailing conclusion that all sides in the Bosnian conflict are guilty causes the West to ignore the practices of cultural genocide against Muslim populations.

In "Nationalism and Self-Determination: The Bosnian Tragedy," Jean Bethke Elshtain explains another reason for the lack of direct action by the West to stop atrocities in Bosnia. The problem is that the United Nations, for a time, did not recognize Bosnia as a sovereign nation. According to Elshtain, "the United Nations Charter [only] makes provision for response to violation of the territory of a sovereign state" (46). To Elshtain, this stand is unacceptable. He also criticizes the West for regarding international conflicts with "national security interests, first and foremost, in mind" (47). Using the "just war" theory, both principles and interests would be considered in assessing whether intervention in a given conflict is or is not warranted. As Elshtain maintains, "if our [United States] policy makers had been guided by just war principles, my hunch is that, under the Nuremberg precedent, genocidal political aggression cannot be permitted to stand" (49). Like Davis, Elshtain notes the problem of nationalism in Bosnia and recommends a "middle way" between multicultural absolutists, who insist that different identities cannot mix, and civic pluralists, who preach universal solidarity (50-3). Elshtain, however, does not explain the ways in which this "middle way" can be achieved.

James Turner Johnson, in "War for Cities and Noncombatant Immunity in the Bosnian Conflict," describes the element of "double effect" in the "just war" theory. The idea of "double effect" asserts that, although deliberate and direct attacks on noncombatants is considered unjust, noncombatants can be legitimately harmed or killed if they are the unintentional victims during an assault on a military target. Considering the war in Bosnia, Johnson uses an important example to illustrate the weakness of the "double effect" idea in protecting noncombatants from unjust harm. In Sarajevo, Bosnian Serbs would cut off the water supplies to the civilian Muslim populations. As the inhabitants left their homes to attain water from a limited number of public taps (most likely, near military institutions), the Bosnian Serbs would fire upon them. According to Johnson: "If the besiegers employ means of attack that are by nature indiscriminate or disproportionate in their effects, then I am less willing to grant the double effect excuse, and if these means are chosen so as to increase the burden of possible harm on the noncombatants present and may be judged so because they are likely to have their primary effect against these and not the combatant defenders, then double effect reasoning emphatically does not apply" (84). Johnson maintains that international law, which establishes civilized war tactics, does not sufficiently address the problems associated with siege warfare.

Unlike the other essays, which condemn the West for its lack of response to the Bosnian conflict, G. Scott Davis' contribution includes a criticism of the actions employed by the West. In "Bosnia, the United States, and the Just War Tradition," Davis charges the United States and the European Community with violating the "just war" theory through their arms embargo. The purpose of the embargo imposed in September 1991 was to minimize the violence and contain the war in Croatia. The embargo, however, shifted the balance in favor of the Serbs, who inherited munitions and material from the Yugoslav National Army. Davis maintains that the embargo, which favored Serbia, "should have been particularly offensive given the conduct of the Serbs, who had already displayed a willingness to attack civilian targets and to condone atrocities" (113). Davis concluded that the proper response of the West would have been to lift the embargo and supply aid directly to the Bosnian government (114).

In the final essay, John Kelsay condemns the Western media for portraying the Muslim culture as barbarian and hostile to modernizing influences. In "Bosnia and the Muslim Critique of Modernity," Kelsay compares the Bosnian Muslims' situation to that of the Jews during the Second World War. Kelsay uses the observations of Richard L. Rubenstein to explain that, by disregarding the Muslim community as being incapable of modernization, the West defines the Bosnian Muslims as "outside the universe of moral obligation" (125). Thus "the United Nations, the European Community, and NATO all function as 'silent partners' in the efforts of the Serbians to create an 'ethically pure' region for themselves in Bosnia-Herzegovina" (125).

By using the "just war" theory to analyze the conflict in Bosnia, this compilation is an important work. It is critical to have a criterion whereby "just" or "unjust" war practices can be clearly defined. Terms, such as "genocide" and "unjust," are often used so loosely that their meanings become ambiguous and less useful. Zachery T. Irwin, who reviewed the book for Library Journal (November 15, 1996, p. 75), criticized the analogy for a lack of a conclusion. This reviewer disagrees. The conclusion of this work is that, through an understanding of the "just war" theory, the West should become more directly involved in stopping the atrocities committed in Bosnia. The argument itself, however, is weak. All contributors have little regard for nationalist feelings in the Balkans and elsewhere. Nationalism is important for producing a healthy identity for a people and instilling in them a sense of dignity and self-worth which can prompt an oppressed people to fight for their place in the world. Certainly, there are negative aspects of nationalism, however, Elshtain's insistence on retooling nationalist feelings to find a "middle way" seems very naïve. The contributors consider the Bosnian conflict as would many international journalists. Such journalists often take a global stand on many issues. Such a stand, however, underestimates the power and importance of nationalist aspirations which can determine whether a conflict, no matter how morally "unjust," warrants the risk of Western lives.

A sardonic mock-Michelin Guide to a city under siege, containing an extraordinary mixture of useful information, chilling factual statement, ironic observation and almost unbearable black humour

Honig and Both are Dutch foreign policy specialists who take an academic approach to the massacre of Srebrenica in Bosnia in July 1995. Their detailed accounts of UN policy debates and genocidal Serb attacks on the civilian population leading to the expulsion of over 20,000 women and children and the murder of 6,000 Bosnian Muslim men clearly demonstrate the failure of the international community's tepid approach to peace-keeping and the responsibility of the military and political leaders involved. There were no heroes at Srebrenica, only variable levels of guilt. The book is dispassionate and slightly distanced from the moral implications of the massacre. It is indeed a 'record of a war crime'.

The Bosnian Serbs, commanded by General Ratko Mladic and led politically by Radovan Karadzic (both indicted for war crimes by the Hague tribunal), carefully planned for weeks and months the reduction of the Srebrenica enclave. They had calculated the number of buses needed to transport the Muslim men to their killing fields, and they ordered the victims to remove their shoes before being shot in order to thwart identification.

The book is divided into three sections, describing the actual fall of Srebrenica; the slow slide of the international community into the "safe area" concept as a sort of least common denominator; and the months of military and political deterioration leading up to the massacre. There is criticism for everyone: the UN which viewed the safe areas as an interim solution and came to endorse them because Security Council members were unwilling and unable to agree on anything more substantive. For their defense, the Bosnians in Srebrenica relied on the goodwill and the hesitation of their enemy Serbs and on an undersupplied battalion of Dutch soldiers. The US which abandoned the Vance-Owen peace plan without a viable alternative and then endorsed the creation of "safe areas" without the will to defend them. The authors also point out that policy disputes in Washington prevented the pursuit of a "Frasure Deal", a negotiating track between US Ambassador Robert Frasure and Serb President Slobodan Milosevic. The Bosnian Muslim leadership which refused to evacuate its civilians from Srebrenica long after it recognized the enclave as indefensible. The Dutch government which ostentatiously placed its troops in harm's way in order to satisfy domestic humanitarian demands, but then allowed them to become little more than underfed hostages unable to defend themselves, much less a large civilian population.

But most of all, final and criminal culpability falls to Mladic and Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs with murder in their hearts who achieved military conquest through genocide. For while the authors demonstrate that any number of international players may have been able to stop the massacre of Srebrenica, only one side actually started it, the Serbs.

The book is excellently researched and clearly organized. By allowing the facts to speak for themselves and eschewing vociferous moral censures, Honig and Both have indicted us all for our roles in the worst European massacre since World War Two.

Nowadays, it is hard to imagine how the world was in the heroic years of 1917-45, when the Soviet Union stood alone, attacked, besieged, blockaded and threatened. It was surrounded by enemies, who had allies inside the country, even inside the Party: Trotsky's provocations invited imperialist aggression; Bukharin's efforts to prevent industrialisation and collectivisation would have left the Soviet Union defenceless against the Nazi onslaught. After World War Two, the Soviet leadership had the sheer courage to rebuild the country, and also to create and aid new socialist societies, in the teeth of the US nuclear monopoly.

This book expresses the British Foreign Office's view of the Soviet Union. For, after Yugoslavia won its independence in 1945, with the Red Army's aid, Tito became increasingly anti-Soviet, thus gaining US and British support. The book depicts Tito as Bevin did, saying in 1949, "He's a ..., but he's our ...." The British and US Governments 'kept Tito afloat' with financial aid. The US National Security Council believed that "much as we dislike him, Tito is presently performing brilliantly in our interests in leading successfully and effectively the attack from within the Communist family against Soviet imperialism." (cited p. 300)

The British Government told Tito that they would stop aiding Yugoslavia unless he stopped aiding the Greek revolution: Tito closed the border, trapping half the Greek Liberation Army inside Yugoslavia. Tito's colleagues Dedijer and Djilas slandered Stalin, claiming that he told Tito to stop the aid. Yugoslavia abstained on the UN Security Council vote to send troops to invade Korea and on the UN General Assembly Resolution that falsely branded the People's Republic of China the aggressor in Korea. The NATO powers told Tito to establish friendly relations with the ... Greek Government, which he did. In 1954, he signed a defence pact with Greece and Turkey.

Inside Yugoslavia, Tito increasingly favoured the free market, and he gave its six republics more and more autonomy. In 1963, he created a federal Constitution; in 1970, he gave the republics even more autonomy, and, in the 1974 Constitution, he gave them almost complete autonomy. This successive yielding to devolutionary pressures gave more power and more credibility to those who sought to break away from Yugoslavia. Thus Tito's policies led directly to Yugoslavia's disintegration and descent into war.

This book provides an overwhelming amount of information regarding many of the abuses of power in the balkans that have not been reported in the mainstream press. It clearly demonstrates the truth to the old saying "People who do not understand history are doomed to repeat it." This is very true in the Balkans and Bosko Vukcevich provides the data. There is so much data that one can get overwhelmed, but the book is orgainized in the latter half as a collection of short essays with a clear topical headline. Anyone who wants to understand the real roots to the current problems in the balkans should have a copy of this book.

THIS BOOK by Michael Barratt Brown sheds some light on the origins of the war in Yugoslavia. Like all serious studies, it shows that the wars were not the result of ethnic differences. There are no ethnic differences among the Slavs who make up Yugoslavia. Serbs, Croats and Muslims are not separate nations: they are all Slavs.

But why then did this ghastly conflict suddenly erupt when it did? To answer this question, we have to look at Yugoslavia's economic record. In the late 1980s, Yugoslavia suffered a massive economic crisis.

From its inception in 1945, Tito's Government had tried to integrate Yugoslavia into the capitalist system, receiving credits from the US Government. In 1960, the Yugoslav Government gave up the state monopoly of foreign trade; this meant that it could not protect the country's infant industries. It borrowed heavily from Western banks: the resulting debt payments absorbed 30 per cent of export earnings.

By the 1980s, Yugoslavia had the highest level of debt to national income of any country in Europe. The EC and the banks rejected the Yugoslav Government's requests for help with rescheduling their debts. They demanded that the debts be paid, whatever the cost. The ever-increasing debt burden caused economic disaster. Yugoslavia's economy suffered a catastrophic collapse, which led to a social breakdown.

Barratt Brown quotes Susan Woodward's book, The Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and dissolution after the Cold War, (Brookings Institution, 1995), "The conflict ... is the result of the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy. A critical element of this failure was economic decline, caused largely by a program intended to resolve a foreign debt crisis. More than a decade of austerity and declining living standards corroded the social fabric and the rights and securities that individuals and families had come to rely on." The Guardian/Channel 4 book, Bloody Bosnia, ignores this economic disaster.

In 1983, Yugoslavia placed itself in the International Monetary Fund's hands. The IMF imposed economic measures that as usual worsened the problems. It insisted on cuts in the universal social services and in the programmes which to some extent redistributed wealth to the less developed regions. Devolution of power to the regions also undercut the economic integration so vital to building a united nation.

Yugoslavia stopped being a single market: the South of Yugoslavia lost its Northern markets for primary products. Only a third of its national output and 20 per cent of its capital movements circulated between the regions. This, incidentally, shows how important it is that Britain's workers reintegrate England, Scotland and Wales economically, even under capitalism, to prevent further economic decline.

Between 1980 and 1984, Yugoslavia's standard of living fell by 30 per cent, and unemployment rose to 15 per cent. By 1989, Kosovo's unemployment rate was 50 per cent; in the southern regions, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia, it was between 20 and 30 per cent.

This book shed light on the origins of the war in Yugoslavia. It shows that it is wrong to blame the whole disaster on Serbian aggression, or indeed on Croat fascism or on Bosnian fundamentalism. But if nationalism is not to blame for the war, why does Barratt-Brown maintain that his book's central theme is to 'condemn all forms of nationalism'? Surely, his economic analysis has shown that capitalism, not nationalism, is to blame for the war.

From a 'Left' perspective, he argues, wrongly, that any attempt to build a self-reliant economy must end in disaster, and that only a federal, capitalist, Europe can prevent wars. But the Yugoslav government, as we have seen, relied increasingly on capitalism, creating rivalry between regions and enterprises. This deepened regional inequalities, and increased the pressures towards devolution and breakup. The government imported goods that Yugoslavs could have produced themselves; this created huge debts and increased unemployment.

The people of Yugoslavia, like those of other countries, will have to take responsibility for rebuilding their country. This is a process in which outside forces will have no part.

Editors Akhavan and Howse have compiled a collection of diverse essays that dispel myths and misconceptions about the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and shed new light on largely ignored or misinterpreted information about Yugoslavia's disintegration.

Each essay deals with a specific element of disintegration, and while all of the elements are telling, the chapter by Dragomir Vojnic on economic disparity as a key to the demise of Yugoslavia is most compelling. Vojnic illustrates with population and demographic data the regional disparities that existed among Yugoslavia's different republics. It is easy to see how certain groups grew to be malcontent.

Slovenia and Croatia, historically more prosperous and tied more to Western Europe, enjoyed a higher standard of living, access to the West, and superior infrastructure, and despite massive redistributive efforts on the part of the federal Yugoslav government, attempts to improve quality of life in the more southern regions of Yugoslavia were never quite successful. Indeed, equality was never achieved; Slovenia and Croatia grew tired of bankrolling failing redistribution schemes that had no results. The federal government did not implement infrastructural improvements in regions like Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo in order to make redistributive efforts productive, so the efforts were doomed to failure.

This created a great deal of tension, which of course exacerbated the nationalist question about which Western nations hear and see so much. In fact the problem has been universally diagnosed as being a nationalist one, when fundamentally, the problem is more complex and is rooted in economic inequality.

This book does an excellent job in proving this.