I thought Drakulic's writing describe the feelings of someone's whose society has been destroyed and a new one springs up. Her feelings as well as others are exposed in this book. This book summarizes the dispair of those who witnessed the Serbo-Croatian War of 1990-1991. I think the feelings described in this book, might only apply to the minority of the Croatian people. It certainly conveys a mother's anguish at seeing her child in a country at war.
I think this book conveys the human disaster of war. People suffer in a number of ways. They may not be soldiers, but they still suffer. Old ways die, and new ways may not be convenient to old people. Opportunities arise as can be seen where the woman confiscated another woman's apartment. War makes people old. I think all these feelings are conveyed in the book.

I read this book while studying the Balkans in school and shortly after September 11th. The book is about living war, a concept that is impossible to understand until one has been in a war like situation or has read this book. While I know that I can never say I felt as much pain as she did, I do have a better understanding of what it must have been like for her after 911 and after reading this book. It is an enjoyable read with the ability to touch on deep subjects without being too complex.

I could not put this book down. The author shares, almost in diary form, her insights as the Serb-Croatian war ripped apart her country in the early 1990's. After reading this book,one begins to understand the impact that war had on those who lived that war. While so many books about war describe carnage and attrocities, this book shares the impact that war has on the psyche and hearts of "every day" people making clear that not all wounds in war are to the body. The book reads like well written fiction. Unfortunately, it is not. I can't adequately describe this book. READ IT.

Bringa, a lecturer of social anthropology at Bergen University of Norway, conducted extensive fieldwork over a period of six years in a mixed Croat-Muslim village in Central Bosnia. Through careful ethnography she has observed the ways in which such concepts as "ethnos", "nation", and "religion" were understood by, and effected the Bosnians with whom she studied. She demonstrates the complexities of interethnic relations on a micro-level. This study helps question overarching theories of nationalism, which exaggerate the difference between different nations. This study is detailed, well-researched and well-written. Despite its detail, it can be highly recommended for anybody working on or interested in Bosnia, former Yugoslavia and interethnic relations.

Bringa provides here a very readable and accessible discussion of identity boundaries in a mixed Muslim/Catholic village during the period directly before the Bosnian War. Her chapter on the history and historiography of Bosnian identity is, I think, the best piece available on the subject. Her treatment of local culture and local boundaries is warmly written and scholarly... in the best tradition of anthropological literature.

I have used this course in an undergraduate seminar I taught to very good effect. The students enjoyed the book and seemed to get a lot out of it.

This book is not a primer on the Bosnian War, nor does it attempt to make a global explanation for why that war occurred. It is however a tremendous resource on Bosnian Muslim culture and a very important contribution to the literature on identity and cultural boundaries. For those interested in such issues, I can give this work a very strong recommendation.

Filled with observation of the Muslim and (to a lesser extent) Croat culture of a typical mixed Muslim-Croat village in central Bosnia. The author, a Norwegian anthropologist, had done fieldwork in Bosnia-Hercegovina during the five years preceding the 1992-1995 wars. She wrote the book during those wars and after the village that she had studied had been destroyed. Well worth reading. (I discovered Bringa as I was writing Untangling Bosnia and Hercegovina, a book about post-war Bosnia and Hercegovina. I found her book to be an absolutely unique and valuable resource.)

There is little doubt that the 78-day NATO air campaign against Serbia in March-June 1999, dubbed Operation Allied Force, will remain highly controversial for a long time. NATO launched a limited war against Serbia in order to stop the vicious on-going ethnic cleansing campaign in the province of Kosovo and although ultimately Serb President Milosevic "blinked," it was an inelegant victory. Yet the victory was hardly inevitable and until the final weeks the air campaign appeared to be ineffective in bending Milosevic to meet NATO's demands. In NATO's Air War for Kosovo, RAND analyst Benjamin S. Lambeth has written an incisive strategic assessment of the air campaign as part of a US Air Force research project on the operation. Rather than a detailed, blow-by-blow account of the air war, Lambeth offers detailed analysis on the major achievements and problems in Allied Force. While other more detailed books will surely follow on the Kosovo War, Lambeth's volume will certainly be a good place to start in understanding this complex operation.

NATO's Air War for Kosovo consists of eight chapters, beginning with two brief chapters that outline events leading up to the air campaign. The air campaign itself is covered a chapter 3, a 50-page summary that covers the main events of NATO air operations but does not provide a day-by-day account. The fourth chapter addresses the possible reasons for the Serb capitulation and stresses that it was not just the air campaign in isolation that prompted this outcome. The fifth chapter covers the three main unique accomplishments of the war: combat debut of the B-2, UAV employment and increased contributions from space-based resources to combat operations. However the heart of this book lies in chapters 6-7, which address friction and operational problems and lapses in strategy and implementation. It is in these 118 pages - 47% of the book - that Lambeth lays out his most significant assessments of the war. Readers will note in the bibliography that Lambeth's source-material derives from two primary venues: contemporary newspaper accounts and post-war interviews with participants.

While Operation Allied Force was deemed a victory, it was a disappointing campaign from the military perspective. As Lambeth notes, "notwithstanding its ultimate success, what began as a hopeful gambit for producing Milosevic's quick compliance soon developed, for a time at least, into a seemingly ineffectual bombing experiment with no clear end in sight..." and, "NATO's air war for Kosovo [was] a step backward in efficiency when compared to the Desert Storm campaign." Lambeth lays out the military frustrations of Allied Force in clinical detail, beginning with the inability of the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) operations to completely shutdown the resilient Serb mobile SAM batteries. The problems with "flex targeting" also prevented the air campaign from seriously hurting the Serb army in Kosovo or even interfering with the ongoing ethnic cleansing. So many other problems surfaced, including the Chinese Embassy bombing, airspace management congestion, interoperability problems with NATO, collateral damage and the Task Force Hawk fiasco that it almost seems amazing that NATO actually won. In terms of strategic lapses, Lambeth particularly hammers on President Clinton's decision to remove the ground option a priori as reducing NATO's threats to a single dimension. This threat was then further diminished by the assumption that Milosevic would fold after a token 3-4 days of bombing and the adoption of a small-scale escalation model for the bombing campaign. When the token bombing didn't work, NATO was forced to rethink its strategy and opted for ad hoc targeting, which was hindered by overly complicated NATO planning procedures and bad weather. Instead of taking down entire systems in Serbia - like air defense and electrical power - as the airpower enthusiasts advocated, the air campaign instead developed as a muddled, escalatory series of poorly-coordinated raids. In the end, Lambeth concludes that it was the inability of the Serb air defenses to shoot-down a significant number of NATO aircraft and the gradual destruction of Serbia's economic-industrial infrastructure that were probably the air campaign's greatest contribution to Milosevic's decision to agree to NATO demands. However, Lambeth is quick to note that the Russian abandonment of Milosevic, diplomatic isolation and the threat of eventual NATO ground operations also had a major impact on the Serb leader's decision. Milosevic's decision to escalate the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo was also a major strategic blunder that partly counter-acted NATO mistakes; Serb atrocities only served to harden NATO resolve for victory.

There are a few areas where Lambeth treads too lightly. In terms of accomplishments, American Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) capabilities were impressively displayed in Operation Allied Force. Including Scott O'Grady's F-16 shot down earlier, American CSAR capabilities are 3 for 3 in the Balkans, which improves the morale of US pilots and hurts the morale of the enemy. Lambeth also fails to provide any real overall assessment of the damage done to Serbia by airpower in Allied Force, nor even a summary of the major infrastructure targets that were affected. Finally, while Lambeth mentions the strikes on the Belgrade TV station on 21 April 1999, he fails to put this raid in moral context. Inadvertent collateral damage is a painful but unavoidable fact or warfare - as Lambeth notes - but deliberate targeting of a civilian facility is another matter. The Laws of Warfare, which the United States adheres to explicitly prohibit attacks directed against civilians and/or attacks that serve no military purpose. While the TV station was a conduit for Milosevic's propaganda, this did not make it a legitimate military target. Therefore, the order to attack the TV station was both immoral and illegal and the US military leaders who carried it out could someday be liable before an international tribunal. Given the large numbers of targets that were "scrubbed" during the campaign for weather or collateral damage reasons, it is amazing that this attack was carried out in downtown Belgrade.

I was very impressed with this book. I have read a number of books on this operation and the book I thought would be the best overall review was the book written by General Clark. Unfortunately, for me that book did not provide much detail on the actual working of the operation. He focused on the political side of the air war and what it took to get the NATO members to play nice with each other. I came away from his book with some details, but a bit disappointed. This book on the other hand was exactly what I wanted. I always love it when I pick up a book and it turns out to completely exceed my expectations. It's like getting a great surprise gift.

This book had it all, a good overview of the lead up to the NATO action, a solid review of the weapon systems that were used, when they were used and how they were used, coverage of the operational issues and a good overall political review. I truly think that if you are looking for the one volume book that covers the war from the NATO point of view then this is the one. The book also did a good job in covering the effectiveness of the overall campaign and the working relationship of NATO. The authors did not present it as all success and good feeling, but the true problems that came out of any operation of this size with this many chiefs. He authors do a good job of presenting the difficulties of working on an operation with so many people that have to agree and showing that this organizational structure did more for the Serbian's then anyone else. Overall I thought this was a great book.

This book is a must read for anyone interested in the role and efficacy of air power. This account is well-balanced giving the story from the pro air power and anti airpower views. It also answers the nagging questions you may have had after reading the incredibly uninformative and shallow accounts in the press. The book posits the reasons. An example -- the book provides the reasons for the need for a credible ground threat for airpower to be effective. Books such as Bombing to Win only state the need. Detailed, nuanced and spot-on accurate.

Brian Hall has really open my eyes in understanding what triggers the Balkan war ie suspicious, revenge, fear, not understanding and non-tolerance among the ethnic. These are the traits that usually leads to a disaster, no matter which part of world you live in.

I read Brian Hall's account of the Balkan conflict while in Zagreb on a language immersion program. I was incredibly impressed by his ability to give a balanced view on this incredibly difficult land. I felt his astute observations made it easier for me to remain neutral in my views and perceptions of the land, people and complicated situation. I was surrounded by ultra-nationalists, and honestly did not meet a single person in Croatia that could look at their role objectively. Brian Hall's insights helped me to step back and view the situation with a completely different outlook.

Brian Hall knows there is no reasonable way to explain what happened in Yugoslavia, so he doesn't even try, at least not in this exciting if somber travelogue. What he does do is travel extensively in that country and engage in conversation with all sorts of people, many of them journalists who themselves are trying to figure out what is going on politically in their own country. Apart from a few wry comments and astute observations on some of the more glaring inanities and venalities he encounters, Hall refrains from expressing his own opinions, prefering to let his several interlocutors express the truth in their own words and ways. The difficulty is that there are several truths here, or versions of it. Croatians are Catholic and they think they hate the Serbs because they are Orthodox. They are unable to admit they hate Serbs because they feel dominated by Belgrade. On the other hand, Serbs think they despise Croatians because they are Catholics and because Croatians helped the Nazis when they came calling. They can't admit to a certain envy of Croatia's Western orientation. An underlying philosophical theme of this book is 'attitude to truth.' South Slavic culture seems to believe that one can be in possession of the truth absolutely and for all time. The idea of striking out independently and asking questions that might lead to more and more questions is simply not part of the Yugoslav mindset. Each group or 'republic' has its own view of reality and this is usually so out of sync with the rest of the country that there is no point in discussion or conversation. The only solution is force, or so each party thinks. If you can't make sense of your neighbor's point of view, kill him and his family and friends. This general outlook must have helped Milosevic in his sleazy rise to power. Most Yugoslavs, as Hall points out, believe that Serbian and Croatian are two distinct languages, which is completely at odds with what linguistics tells us. And then there is Bosnia and its overwhelmingly Muslim population, unloved by both the Croatians and the Serbs. In hindsight, one shudders to think... The journey described in this book took place in 1991, when things were starting to heat up in the Balkans. Slovenia had just separated. The author shows how ominous things were at that point, how one didn't need much imagination to foresee what the unhappy future would hold, including the sad Kosovo events. Hall has done a masterful job of describing Yugoslavia on the verge of disintegration. He includes excellent descriptions of buildings and landscapes, but his more important work is reporting on the interviews he conducted with real people in real situations of frustration, danger, and sometimes despair. Now that the NATO bombing of Serbia and Kosovo is just a puzzling memory, we should all go and read a lot of books that show how and why all that came about. Of all such books, this is one of the best I know of.

I would probably give this book 4 and 1/2 stars. The only thing that I found unappealing about the book was a long, dry discussion the the Presidential War Powers Act about half way into the book but once I got around that I was pleased with the treatment of the topic. The book took a look at many of the issues that were avoided or "spun" by the US media to paint the war as a humanitarian triumph when in reality it was a humanitarian tragedy that actually reversed the ethnic cleansing (Serbs forcibly removed by Albanians from their homes) and all done with US and NATO approval. The book also predicted that the support of the Kosovar Albanians during the war would fuel Albanian irridentism which would spill into Macedonia (which occured last year) and destabilize the whole region. This is a lesson on how NOT to conduct foreign diplomacy. The thing I found very revealing was the number of events leading up to, during, and after the war that, I remember, described by the Clinton, Albright, and the Western media in a certain way that in actuality happened differently and even some things that were never reported. An example was the bombing of bridges and power plants in Belgrade that did more to harm civilians than the Serbian military. Not only Serbia but a number of countries in eastern Europe were affected economically due to the blocking of Danube by the collapsed bridges. River commerce on the Danube just opened this year, almost 3 years later. The book also took a critical look at the US's foreign policy double standard: touting human rights as a reason for intervention but only when it serves US interests (read why not intervene in Rwanda, East Timor, etc.) or intervene except when the human rights abuses are commited by allies (i.e Turkey).

A real gem of an essay collection: articulate, passionate, and in the deepest sense, boldly patriotic. From several different angles, the authors of these essays -- eminently qualified scholars, diplomats, and foreign policy experts -- show why NATO's military aggression against Yugoslavia, under the guise of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, was bad, very bad, for America's national interest. Here from the introduction, is a brief balance sheet on the Clinton-Albright war of aggression: "In the course of acquiring the dubious role of baby sitter of the Balknas, NATO inflicted enormous suffering on innocent Serbian and Albanian Kosovar civilians; created serious economic and political prolbmes for neighboring Balkan countries, stimulated fears through the world that the democratic West had embarked on a new round of imperialism under a phony banner of humanitarian intervention; further undermined a key provision of the U.S. Constitution; and badly damaged relations with Russian and China."

One wonders, after reading these essays, why did the so-called "independent" Western press act as publicist and promoter for US foreign policy? Where were the dissenters? Moroever, these essays suggest that the real dangers in the Balkans are Albanian nationalism and NATO expansionism. Do we want American soldiers sacrificed in foreign wars that have no impact on our national interest -- in fact, undermine out national interest? Read this book!

The author's writing style is clear and concise. There is good support in terms of data and comparisons to support the main points. The book addressed my concerns about what is really behind NATO's first ever military actions against a economic third world country that had not attacked nor threatened militarily any of the members of the NATO alliance. I was also curious how NATO justified acting on behalf of the United Nations in spite of a lack of consensus on the part of the Security Council - the book give a convicing explanation. More trouble is ahead in NATO occupied Kosovo. This book can be useful in understanding why. Good reading.

"Blueprints" is an extensive analysis of a largely overlooked and insufficiently studied aspect of Yugoslavia's break-up: the actual changes made to the legal order of the separate republics and the federation as a whole, and their consequences. One of the most important initial points made by Hayden is that the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, which was effective until the country's demise, established a very complicated, decentralized and hard-to-govern federation. The ambiguities contained in many of this constitution's provisions facilitated later moves by various federal units (the republics) to justify as constitutonal their moves for greater sovereignty at the federation's expense. Hayden's consideration of the various constitutional structures established in the various republics after Yugoslavia's break-up forms the heart of this book. He argues that countries like Slovenia, Croatia, etc. can be characterized as exhibiting 'constitutional nationalism,' since the predominance in the state of one ethnic nation is embedded in the very constitutional and legal order. Also interesting is his sharp critique of the constitutional fiction in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its 'entities.' Perhaps the book's main weakness is that it fails to sufficiently emphasize that the constitutional disputes occurring in Yugoslavia just before the country's break-up were not occurring in a political vacuum; Hayden's argument seems to be that the Slovenes bear most of the initial responsibility for Yugoslavia's collapse because of the amendments to their republic constitution amounted to a unilateral derogation of the federal constitution. This fails to take into account Serbia's less than constitutional abrogation of autonomy in its provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and even the federal republic of Montenegro. In the book's preface and introduction, Hayden attempts - rather unconvincingly - to explain away his lack of focus on Serbia, but this remains the primary weakness in his overall argument. Nevertheless, this is still a very important contribution to understanding Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav political and legal problems.

Robert Hayden is uniquely qualified to examine the Yugoslav mess - as a legal scholar who is deeply familiar with the families, clans, tribes and nations who made up the first and second Yugoslavias and as an anthropologist who can find his way through the constitutional jungles those peoples created. This is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand how the Bosnian civil war developed out of competing competing constitutional interpretations.

Outstanding for public law scholars. Shows how the unskillful management of conflict in a constitutional system leads to dissolution.

Any translation is going to be challenging. Richard Williams' translation from the Serbo-Croatian comes across as choppy, sputtering in its inner dialogue, which may or may not reflect the rhythms of Aleksandar Tisma's original. As a psychological study, this is a great book. It delves into the mind of Lamian who survives Auschwitz by becoming a Kapo, or prison leader, who beats, kills and rapes his fellow Jews in order to survive. As a novel, it is less successful because while many brutalities are graphically recalled, not much happens in the present. Like bookends, we start as Lamian thinks he has finally found Helena Lifka and end in her flat. In the meantime, we flash back, find out about Lamian's struggles as a boy, his distance from his Jewish parents, his college struggles, his sexual self-discovery and the perversions of war, and then the haunting remembrance of brutality that will not fade and not allow him to live a normal life. Lamian is disturbed from the beginning of the novel, and only experiences momentary peace. This book is a difficult read not only because of the translation and the novel's construction which is one long internal dialogue, but because of the difficult nature of the subject matter. It is sometimes difficult to tell the difference between the past and present, which is how it must be for the main character. It is a brave book, facing realities that need to not be forgotten. It is particularly interesting because it details the treatment of Jews in Serbia during World War II. Read & weep.

A story of mimicry that ends up always badly.

A Jewish child baptized in a roman-catholic church because his parents wanted him to feel more comfortable in his environment, grows into a student in Zagreb hiding his identity amidst his nationalistic Croatian colleagues, ends up in an infamous concentration camp in Jasenovac, Croatia, tortured by one of his former colleagues.

The mimicry saves him again when he trades places with a dead Serb. But that gets him sent to Auschwitz. There he becomes a KAPO. He spies on other inmates, has more privilege than other inmates, abuses other inmates promissing them food.

A mimicry is again at work after the war when he has a good governement position in Yugoslavia, being considered a "victim of Nazi terror". Pangs of conscience catch up with him though.

The greatness of this book is the fact that as much as we despise him for his weakness, we feel sorry for him. And all the while we ask ourselves: "How can I be sure that I would be stronger in such an extreme situation". This is a powerfull book with deeply human message. I couldn't put it down and spent a sleepless night until I finished it...

Much has been written detailing the experiences of the victims of the Holocaust, but there is less fiction dealing with the minds of the perpetrators and collaborators. In "Kapo" Tisma has presented a glimpse into the mind of one such collaborator. This amazing portrait of self-loathing and paranoia held me transfixed like a rabbit in caught in the glare of headlights. I highly recommend "Kapo" for anyone who wants to be kept up late at night in a state of agitation

Very interesting and useful, even though it focuses on the short (but pivotally important) time period of 1918-1921.

A while since I read this book. Useful detail of croatian political dynamics dating from mid/late C19 to late 1930's. Avoids any real detail on the rise to power of the Ustashe movement. The content tries to be objective and suceeds to a certain extent.

This is perhaps one of the best books on thenational/nationalist problems that have beset the former Yugoslaviasince its formation after World War I. In fact, the author primarily analyzes the short period during and immediately after the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1918, his central thesis being that the overlapping nationalist ideologies and problems which appeared then were never directly addressed and continued to plague the country (all up until its disintegration in 1990 and even afterwards). "The National Question in Yugoslavia" extensively describes the nationalisms of all Yugoslav peoples, not just the Croats. Also, since the work focuses on the early 1920s, it would have been pointless to discuss the origins of the Croatian Ustasha, since this ultra-nationalist fascist movement only emerged about ten years later. In the same vein, one could criticize this book for not providing a deeper exploration of the origins of the Serbian Chetnik movement... This is definitely THE book to read if you want a better understanding of the problems and rivalries that existed in Yugoslavia and led to the violent break-up of that country twice: during World War II and at the beginning of the 1990s.

Bert's book is a uniquely systematic work, focusing on American policy from hindsight and the perspective of "New World Order." It is a must-read for every political scientist and historian of the region. However, it abounds with misconceptions, simplifications and all too often overt ethnic preferences. Readers familiar with the region will find his terminology questionable, CNN-educated will find it confirming their views, and some actors in those events might be surprised that Bert mentions few names. On the other hand, it is good to see a book about this subject out there. Anything, however flawed, is better than nothing. Read with caution, but read nevertheless.

This book is well written and insightful. Well documented and organized for clarity. A valuable resource for anyone concerned about international politics and America's international role.

Hi Wayne, Remember me? Wilmington College 1977. Just read a (good) review of your book on US politics in Bosnia in the major daily here (in Holland). Would like to get it to you, if I can find you somewhere. Please drop me a line. Frank van Alten fvacomm@xs4all.nl home: Leonardostraat 8 1077 EV Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Although the facts and the personality of Milosevic are properly described, the book is, in my opinion, too partial. I don't think it is lack of knowledge but the will to believe it that way.
This eternal dichotomy of "good boys and bad boys" that in America is so much extended, appears very strongly in this book, specially when the role of the USA is concerned.Too simple,I must say.
Let's say that it is a good book to be red in America...

How does a political hack working for the Yugoslavian Communist party evolve into a skilled manipulator of people, and Europe's worst Fascist politician since Adolf Hitler? In the case of Slobodan Milosevic there are no easy answers, yet former diplomat Louis Sell offers a riveting account of Milosevic's life that depicts the latter's transformation from Communist bureaucrat to a dangerous political demagogue. Along the way Sell provides an in-depth look at the rise and fall of modern Yugoslavia, beginning with the closing phases of World War Two, as Tito's Communist partisans battled both the Nazis and other forces belonging collectively to the Yugoslavian "underground", most notably the Serbian Chetniks. Sell suggests that Milosevic hasn't become a rabid nationalist, but instead, has used the cause of Serbian nationalism to further his own political agenda, granting him virtual control over the rump state of Yugoslavia until his sudden downfall in free elections held after the NATO bombing of Serbia in response to the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo. Sell introduces us to a fascinating group of characters, beginning with Croatian president Tudjman, and ending with the likes of American diplomats and soldiers such as Richard Holbrooke and General Wesley Clark. Unquestionably this may be the best book published yet on what transpired in Yugoslavia during the 1990's.

Mr.Sell was my professor at the University of Maine at Farminton, and he was incredibly knowledgeable on the conflict in Yugoslavia. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the region and the conflicts that have gone on there. Sells experience is reflected in this writings and is a must for any political science or international relations student.